Does ASEAN support US military presence in South China Sea?
2018-04-08 15:45:56 source：NISCSS
April 2, 2018
On March 23, the US Navy destroyer Mustin made a non-innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef. China saw this as yet another “serious political and military provocation”. This latest Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) came amidst a downturn in US –China relations—particularly regarding the South China Sea (SCS).
Soon after that came a relevant statement by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in a written interview with Australian media. In an assessment of the United States’ role in Southeast Asian security he asserted that, “Most ASEAN members support and welcome the US stance.” Since Singapore is this year’s ASEAN Chair, Lee’s statement may hold special weight. But if taken out of context, his words may be misinterpreted.
Lee’s statement was a general assessment of the US role as a “Pacific power” -- not specifically its behavior in the SCS. Indeed, he was referring to US Defense Secretary James Mattis’ affirmation at the 2017 Shangri-La Dialogue that Southeast Asia was a priority area and that the US was committed “to the region’s security and prosperity”.
Lee also wrote, “From the region’s perspective, the most critical issue is the political and strategic resolve of the US to project a reliable and constructive presence as a Pacific power”. He was conveying some uncertainty about that commitment and resolve.
The key phrases in his assessment are “reliable and constructive presence” and “commitment to the region’s security and prosperity”. As Lee said at the March 18 ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, “The SCS is an issue for specific ASEAN countries which are claimant states … It's an issue for the rest of the ASEAN countries too because this is a security and stability question in Southeast Asia which will affect all”.
Of course all ASEAN members would welcome US commitment to the region’s security and prosperity. But a more specific question is, do most ASEAN members view the US military presence and activities in the SCS as “reliable and constructive” and thus contributing to “the region’s security and prosperity”?
It is difficult to assess the answer to this critical question from the perspective of ASEAN members because in the ASEAN style, negative official statements identifying the subject country are very rare.
It is clear that Singapore warmly welcomes the US military presence — and even facilitates it by providing temporary basing and refueling for its warships and intelligence collection aircraft. This is understandable because Singapore’s economy depends very heavily on commercial freedom and safety of navigation which it hopes the US military presence will ensure.
Vietnam also clearly welcomes and supports the US military presence and has been appealing to the US to balance China’s influence in the region. Vietnam has clashed militarily with China in the past in the SCS and came close in 2014 when a Chinese oil rig entered waters that it claims.
But Vietnam is nothing but opportunistic. Its warming to US will last just as long as it is needed. There is no alignment of fundamental interests — other than to contain China-- and really very little coincidence of values between its Communist authoritarian system and that of the liberal democratic US. Moreover Vietnam is steadfastly non-aligned. Indeed, its long standing policy is the “three nos” – no participation in military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory, and no reliance on one country to fight against another. This is not likely to change.
Some other ASEAN members are apparently less sanguine about US military involvement in the SCS.
Some Indonesian policymakers remain suspicious of US motives and worry about the potential destabilizing effect of US-China competition. They want Washington to exercise restraint. Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu has suggested that “if regional countries can manage the SCS on their own, there is no need to involve others.” Luhut Pandjaitan, then coordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs, once declared in a veiled criticism of both US and China “… we don’t like any power projection.”
The position of the Philippines is quite surprising. President Rodrigo Duterte clearly does not have confidence that the long-time ally US would back it up in a kinetic conflict with China - - which is apparently one reason he pivoted Philippine foreign policy towards China. When the US Navy’s Hopper undertook a freedom of navigation operation near disputed Scarborough Shoal, it got no support from the Philippines. Philippine Presidential spokesman Harry Roque said, “The problem of America today is no longer the problem of the Philippines.”
Although a rival claimant, Brunei’s position seems to be reaching an accommodation with that of China. US relations with non-claimant Thailand have not been close since the military coup there in 2014 and it seems to be leaning towards China. Non-claimants Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar do not have a direct interest in the SCS and are either neutral or in China’s camp on this issue.
Given that all littoral ASEAN members except Singapore and Brunei have been targets of US Navy FONOPs, it is safe to say that they do not approve of this aspect of US military actions –at least against themselves.
Nevertheless, US officials continue to speak and act as if the US military presence and activities are warmly welcomed in the region without reservation. But Southeast Asian support may be much shallower and more ephemeral than it thinks.This clearly manifested last August when ASEAN leaders and their dialogue partners, including China and the US, held a series of key security meetings in the Philippines. Regarding the SCS issues, the joint communiqué of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting strongly favored China’s preferences over those of its opponents within ASEAN and those of the US.
Both China and the US are pressuring various ASEAN members to support their interests in the SCS and this has led to disunity within ASEAN. A particular concern is that their intensifying competition could spill over into these countries’ domestic politics, interfering in their internal affairs a la Cold War period.
Mark J. Valencia is an Adjunct Senior Scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China
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