Opinion | Beijing’s approach to South China Sea tensions: reduce now, resolve later
2025-04-25 17:27:50 source：SCMP
April 24, 2025
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent Southeast Asian tour has put the South China Sea – a simmering cauldron of territorial and maritime disputes – back into focus.
Amid joint statements brimming with diplomatic finesse, Beijing is sending a clear message: it seeks to manage tensions and not escalate them while keeping its strategic compass firmly pointed towards cooperation and regional stability.
The statements – issued alongside Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur – emphasise peaceful dispute resolution, adherence to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and an aversion to escalations.
Against a backdrop of United States-Philippines military drills and lingering scepticism about Beijing’s intentions, Xi’s tour revealed a nuanced diplomatic playbook. Far from the caricature of an expansionist power, China is signalling its willingness to embrace international law, pragmatic dispute resolution and a vision of shared prosperity that respects Asean.
Beijing wants to keep South China Sea disputes in their proper place – significant, yes, but not the be-all and end-all of ties with neighbours. The China-Vietnam joint statement shows that both sides want to manage their differences to boost cooperation. Similarly, the China-Malaysia joint statement frames maritime cooperation as just one pillar of their comprehensive strategic partnership.
This is less starry-eyed optimism and more hard-nosed pragmatism. Despite overlapping maritime claims, China remains Vietnam’s top trading partner, and the two socialist neighbours are moving to expand cross-border rail links. Malaysia, meanwhile, is a linchpin in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with projects like the East Coast Rail Link chugging along. It’s all part of Beijing’s message: don’t let the choppy waters of the South China Sea capsize the economic lifeboats.
Yet, this isn’t about ignoring the elephant in the room. For now, Xi’s visits signal a desire to compartmentalise disputes, ensuring they don’t poison the well of trade, infrastructure and people-to-people ties. If tensions flare unchecked, nationalist currents in claimant states could still muddy these waters. In this sense, the visits serve dual purposes on the South China Sea issue.
Domestically, they aim to prevent nationalist sentiments from hijacking foreign policy. Internationally, they reassure members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that Beijing views them as multidimensional partners, not mere contestants in a zero-sum game. They also stifle meddling from “outside forces” – probably a veiled reference to the US’ and the Philippines’ confrontational stance.
While other Asean claimants pursue quiet diplomacy, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has doubled down on US military ties. This divergence stems partly from domestic politics: the Marcos family’s historical ties to Washington and the need to counterbalance China’s embrace by rival elites. Yet Manila’s gambit carries risks. Asean’s non-confrontational ethos leaves the Philippines increasingly isolated. Others have avoided megaphone diplomacy over maritime disputes with China.
China’s strategy of bilateral talks with claimants paired with collective China-Asean efforts to keep the peace is another loud signal. The China-Vietnam statement implies that this approach works while the China-Malaysia text warns that intervention by parties not directly concerned may be counterproductive.
Beijing has long favoured one-on-one negotiations, rarely resorting to “extreme pressure” measures like those of the Donald Trump administration. It’s also important to note that China’s economic and military power makes it impervious to US military deterrence or international tribunals that it perceives as US intervention. For example, China continues to dismiss the 2016 arbitration ruling at The Hague in favour of the Philippines.
Critics argue that bilateralism privileges Beijing, leaving other claimants wary of being strong-armed. Nevertheless, successful negotiations demand restraint from all sides – a tough feat when fishing spats or drilling rigs escalate tensions. However, Xi’s Southeast Asia tour reinforces how China wants disputes handled with Asean as a partner, not a pawn in great-power games.
The buzz around the South China Sea code of conduct discussions has become louder with Xi’s tour. Both statements called for speeding up talks on the long-gestating framework to prevent clashes and manage incidents. Through the talks, China aims to lock in regional calm on its terms.
Will the code of conduct be legally binding, holding all parties – including China – to account? Or will it be a non-binding agreement that is toothless when push comes to shove?
While China prefers a non-binding code of conduct, it could very well consider a legally binding one. China and Asean members should each have an equal say in the rule-making process. Whatever shape the code of conduct ends up taking, parties must apply it equally and be wary of any double standards.
Xi’s push signals that Beijing sees the code of conduct as a way to ensure stability in the South China Sea while dodging external interference. Success hinges on a compromise that balances the needs and concerns of all parties. If successful, the talks could be a diplomatic milestone.
Xi’s Southeast Asia visit wasn’t mere diplomatic theatre – it was a calculated signal flare. China wants the South China Sea disputes contained, not inflamed, and handled through bilateral chats and Asean unity instead of Western referees. It is moving to pitch itself as a law-abiding giant and betting on cooperation to glue the region together. The path ahead remains fraught. Nationalist pressures, resource competition and US containment efforts could derail progress. Yet recent exchanges with Southeast Asian partners show that China is increasingly confident in its ability to manage contradictions as a rising power whose true strength lies not in dominance but in crafting a tolerable equilibrium.
All parties face a historic test and an opportunity: proving that diplomacy can be mightier than the sword in the South China Sea
Ding Duo is director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.