June 29, 2026

With July 12 approaching, the 2016 arbitral ruling in the case unilaterally initiated by the Philippines is once again likely to draw statements from Washington reaffirming support for the award and its findings on maritime entitlements. Such declarations have become an annual ritual, framing the decision as a cornerstone of international law and using it to question the legitimacy of China's positions in the South China Sea. These interventions reveal more about strategic intent than about consistent legal principle. The ruling itself was the product of a process China never accepted, and its selective invocation continues to complicate efforts to manage differences through dialogue rather than confrontation.

The tribunal, which was established at the unilateral request of the Philippines and without China's consent, issued its ruling on July 12, 2016.

Since then, declarations on the matter have become an annual ritual in Washington, framing the decision as a cornerstone of international law and using it to question the legitimacy of China's positions in the South China Sea. These interventions reveal more about strategic intent than they do about consistent legal principle. The ruling itself was the product of a process China never accepted, and its selective invocation continues to complicate efforts to manage differences through dialogue rather than confrontation.

The pattern is familiar. Commentary in the United States routinely highlights freedom of navigation and overflight as non-negotiable, portrays Chinese coast guard and maritime law enforcement operations as destabilizing gray-zone tactics, and expresses alarm over naval modernization and exercises that risk miscalculation. Specific attention often falls on encounters near features such as Second Thomas Shoal, where routine resupply missions have produced repeated friction. Broader linkages are drawn to dynamics in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, suggesting that any shift in one area could cascade into others. These concerns are presented as neutral observations about regional stability, yet they align closely with efforts to maintain longstanding patterns of maritime access and alliance reassurance in waters adjacent to China.

China has maintained from the outset that the arbitral proceedings lacked jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and that the resulting award has no binding effect. Its maritime claims rest on long-standing historical practice, geographic realities, and continuous administration, none of which the tribunal adequately addressed. When the United States endorses the ruling while conducting its own freedom-of-navigation operations and strengthening security ties with regional claimants, it applies different standards, depending on whose interests are at stake. The same legal framework is invoked to constrain one side while preserving operational latitude for the other. This selective approach does little to clarify rules; instead, it adds another layer of contention to an already complex environment.

Operational realities on the water further illustrate the gap between rhetoric and practice. Interactions involving coast guard vessels occur at closer quarters and with different rules of engagement than those involving naval forces alone. When such encounters take place around disputed features, the potential for unintended contact rises, regardless of which party initiates the movement. China's maritime law enforcement presence has developed in response to repeated challenges to its jurisdiction, including activities by other claimants and external powers. Labeling these responses as inherently destabilizing overlooks the sequence of events that produced them. At the same time, the density of surveillance assets and rapid-response capabilities on all sides means that even routine patrols can be interpreted through a worst-case lens.

Both countries nevertheless share a clear stake in preventing incidents from escalating. The South and East China seas facilitate substantial volumes of global trade, and neither side gains from disrupted shipping lanes or an accelerating cycle of military posturing. The costs of miscalculation would extend well beyond the immediate parties involved. This common interest provides a basis for practical measures, even while fundamental differences over sovereignty and maritime rights remain unresolved.

Existing bilateral channels offer the most direct means of addressing immediate risks. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement has enabled regular exchanges on air and maritime safety, including reviews of specific encounters. Recent working-level sessions have demonstrated that these mechanisms continue to function. Their value would increase if discussions moved beyond general exchanges toward more detailed protocols for de-escalation and clearer expectations during unplanned meetings. Extending behavioral guidelines to cover a wider range of maritime actors, particularly coast guard units that now handle much of the day-to-day presence, would close a noticeable gap in current arrangements.

Crisis communication lines between defense establishments exist but require consistent use and prior agreement on procedures if they are to prove effective under pressure. When incidents occur, rapid and professional notification can prevent misinterpretation from hardening into confrontation. Parallel efforts in non-sensitive domains can also build habits of cooperation that make the overall relationship more stable. Coordination on search and rescue, marine environmental monitoring, sustainable fisheries, and scientific data sharing carries limited political risk and produces tangible benefits for all coastal states. These areas allow professional interaction without requiring convergence on disputed legal questions.

Legal dialogue among experts can likewise serve a limited but useful purpose when kept focused. While the 2016 ruling will continue to be cited by some as authoritative, its practical impact depends on how states actually behave. Discussions that examine specific technical issues —navigation safety standards, environmental obligations or the treatment of emerging technologies — can reduce areas of unnecessary friction even if broader interpretive differences persist. The objective should be narrower mutual understanding rather than forced acceptance of contested conclusions.

From China's perspective, constructive engagement requires recognition that territorial sovereignty and maritime rights will not be compromised under external pressure. At the same time, Beijing has consistently signaled a willingness to manage differences through dialogue and to pursue cooperation where interests overlap. The United States, for its part, retains significant maritime capabilities and alliance relationships that shape the regional environment. When statements supporting the 2016 ruling are paired with operational activities that increase proximity and tension, the effect is often to reinforce rather than reduce mistrust.

A more stable maritime order would rest on clearer operational guardrails, reliable communication channels and incremental functional cooperation rather than repeated assertions of legal victory. The recent military-to-military exchanges already indicate that some professional infrastructure remains in place. Strengthening that infrastructure — by refining procedures for encounters, expanding coverage of behavioral norms and pursuing joint work on shared maritime challenges — would serve the interests of both countries and the wider region.

In an environment where capabilities continue to grow and interactions remain frequent, the capacity to prevent incidents from becoming crises matters more than periodic restatements of contested legal positions.

Ding Duo is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

Link:

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202606/29/WS6a4208f7a310986e2b462743.html