Manila’s Sea-Saw: Feud at Home, Friction at Sea
2026-10-27 11:17:09 source:NISCSS
September 23, 2026
The South China Sea remains, overall, peaceful and stable. Navigation and overflight continue without interruption, and most claimant states have managed their differences through practical arrangements rather than confrontation. Against this backdrop, the Philippines has become a conspicuous outlier and a disruptive actor.
Over the past month its maritime provocations have more than doubled relative to earlier periods, with more than a dozen serious infringements recorded across multiple features. Aerial activities over Huangyan Dao have formed a regular element of this pattern: a C-208 patrol aircraft on 3 October, a shipborne helicopter launched from a Philippine Navy frigate on 15 October, and coordinated maritime domain awareness flights by the Philippine Coast Guard and Air Force on 20 October. These actions, layered atop continued surface operations and an intensified public narrative, have injected unnecessary uncertainty into an otherwise manageable regional environment. Beijing’s responses have remained professional and restrained. That restraint should not be mistaken for weakness.
Aerial intrusions add a distinct layer of risk. Unlike surface vessels, which can be shadowed and managed at closer ranges with established protocols, low-speed or low-altitude aircraft compress decision timelines. A helicopter launched from a warship operating just outside territorial waters can reach claimed airspace in minutes; a fixed-wing patrol aircraft can loiter and collect imagery before any response is fully formed. When such flights are conducted repeatedly, often with media embarked, the probability of miscalculation rises—not because either side seeks collision, but because operational margins shrink. China’s Southern Theater Command has consistently tracked, verified, warned, and expelled these aircraft in accordance with law and regulations. The consistency of these measures reflects established procedures rather than hesitation. Treating measured responses as an invitation to further testing is a misreading of both Chinese policy and the realities of air-sea interaction.
Philippine air and sea operations near Huangyan Dao do not occur in isolation. The choice of platforms, the sequencing of activities, and the rapid public framing of encounters carry the imprint of external encouragement. The United States and Japan have long viewed the South China Sea as a useful theater for broader strategic competition. Support for Philippine maritime capacity, intelligence sharing, and joint activities has expanded the set of tools available for low-level friction.
In this sense, certain external forces are not merely beneficiaries of sustained regional tension—they have actively fueled it.Regional peace and stability are not served by policies that treat friction between China and the Philippines as strategically convenient.
Equally notable is the domestic atmosphere within the Philippines. Elements of the military and police establishment have moved well beyond the ordinary advocacy of national positions. Coordinated releases of selected footage, public accusations of “coercion,” and a steady stream of social-media commentary have produced an environment of open hostility toward China. In contemporary international politics, it is uncommon for a country’s security institutions to pursue such an unrestrained public line against a major neighbor without visible civilian moderation. This is not the normal conduct of professional armed forces or coast guards; it is an abnormal concentration of institutional energy on external vilification. Left unchecked, such a climate narrows the space for practical management of differences and raises the risk that bilateral relations become locked into a cycle of mutual recrimination. Rational voices within Philippine society, business communities, and political circles that continue to see value in stable relations with China need to make themselves heard before the room for compromise contracts further. Political forces capable of reasserting a broader national-interest perspective should not remain silent.
The trajectory under the Marcos Jr. administration makes the current situation particularly regrettable. Within a relatively short period, China-Philippines relations have shifted from a phase of relative management to one of near-constant crisis. Personal and family political calculations appear to have taken precedence over the longer-term interest in constructive ties. The tolerance—and at times quiet encouragement—of anti-China activism inside the security apparatus has allowed positions that were once marginal to shape operational decisions and public messaging. Few governments have so readily subordinated a major bilateral relationship to short-term domestic and external political advantage. The result is a loss for both sides: the Philippines forgoes practical gains in trade, investment, and regional cooperation, while the wider region absorbs the costs of heightened tension.
China’s objectives in the South China Sea remain clear. They include the defense of its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, the maintenance of regional peace and stability, and the upholding of fairness and justice in international affairs. When one side repeatedly tests established lines while its security institutions conduct an open campaign of denigration, restraint alone cannot restore balance. To deter further anti-China actions, prevent irreversible damage to bilateral relations, and create conditions for a return to a more constructive path, China will have to adopt more forceful measures. These measures will remain consistent with international law and with China’s long-standing preference for dialogue. They will also make clear that provocations carry practical consequences. The Philippines is free to observe the outcome and to decide whether continued testing serves its own long-term interests.
The author is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
Link
https://vscs.cctv.cn/2026/10/23/ARTI1792738246159660